Abstract In this paper, we present an identity-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocol that is provably secure without random oracles. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session key from key confirmation keys so that there is no direct usage of hash functions in the protocol. The protocol is proved secure without random oracles in a variant of Bellare and Rogaway style model, an exception to current proof method in this style model in the ID-based setting. We believe that this key isolation method is novel and can be further studied for constructing more efficient protocols.
Introduction
This paper focuses on an identity-based key agreement protocol with a standard proof. We introduce some concepts of parsing the topic including an explicit authenticated key agreement protocol, an identity-based protocol, common security properties of key agreement protocols, proof models of such protocols, and usage of random oracles in this field. Related work about identity-based key agreement protocols, security properties, proof models and usage of random oracles are embedded in above concepts.
An explicit authenticated key agreement protocol is a key agreement protocol which provides explicit key authentication [1] . A key agreement protocol or mechanism is a key establishment technique from which a shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information contributed by each of them, and ideally no party can predetermine the resulting value. Key establishment is a process or protocol whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties for subsequent cryptographic use. Explicit key authentication is the property obtained when both implicit key authentication and key confirmation hold. Implicit key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party (and possibly additional identified trusted parties) may access a particular secret key. Finally, key confirmation is the property whereby one party is assured that a second party (possibly unidentified) actually has possession of a particular secret key.
A key agreement protocol is said to be identity-based (ID-based) if the identity information of the party involved is used as the party's public key. After Shamir proposed the idea of identity-based asymmetric key pairs [2] , a few identity-based key agreement protocols based on his idea have been developed, such as [3] [4] [5] . However, practical ID-based protocols, which include [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , boomed after the work of [15, 16] based on pairing techniques. The practical protocols enjoy some security properties, such as perfect forward security (PFS), key compromise impersonation resilience (KCI), etc.
Usually, some security properties are used for evaluating the security of key agreement protocols, including known session key security (KSK), unknown key-share resilience (UKS), PFS, and KCI, etc. By KSK, we mean that the compromise of one session key should not compromise on the keys established in other sessions. UKS means that party A should not be able to be coerced into sharing a key with party C when in fact A thinks that she/he is sharing the key with some party B. PFS in the two-party case usually means that if their private keys are compromised on, the secrecy of session keys previously established by the two parties should not be affected. If the condition is relaxed to only one principle, it is called partially forward security (P-FS). If the condition is restricted by adding the loss of the third trusted party's master key in the ID-based scenario, it is called master-key forward security (M-FS) [13] . By KCI, we mean that the compromise of party A's long-term private key should not enable the adversary to impersonate other parties to A. Some of the above security properties can be captured by a Bellare and Rogaway (BR) style model.
To the best of our knowledge, there are some models proving ID-based protocols, including BR model [17] , BRP model [18] , BCP model [19] , CK model [20] , and UC model [21] , etc. Most ID-based protocols are proved in some variants of the BR model, such as protocols in [9, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Usually, an adversary in a BR style model is powered by some kinds of queries, such as Send, Reveal, Corrupt queries, etc. The execution of a protocol is described as oracle responses to the adversary's queries. After polynomial bounded times queries, the adversary is expected to pass a test with a non-negligible probability. If the adversary cannot pass the test and the protocol transcripts satisfy some secure conditions, it is believed that the protocol is secure in the defined model. Roughly all BR style models are defined and used in the above fashion.
The original BR model provides us a good framework, but it is not suitable for key agreement protocols. Blake-Wilson, Johnson, and Meneze (BJM) extended the BR model to the public key setting [22] . The KSK and UKS properties have been built into the BJM model. The KCI was built into another variant model proposed by Cheng et al. in the definition of nomatching [23] for authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocols. So one can prove a protocol secure with one fresh condition capturing KSK, UKS, and KCI properties [13] . For PFS, there is another independent fresh condition to be defined, and another independent proof procedure to be needed [13, 23, 24] . Another security property SSR also takes the way to define an independent fresh condition, which considers the leakage of temporal private keys [23, 24] . Here we just give arguments about the PFS and SSR properties out of our proof model so that we can present a clearer proof procedure without random oracles in the model. Blake-Wilson et al. adopted the random oracle model (ROM) in their proof procedure. A powerful tool was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway. It is used almost in every key agreement protocols with key confirmation after Blake-Wilson et al.'s work, where hash functions are used for isolating a session key from confirmation keys. Recently ROM is debated for its uninstantiable property [25−27] . Following the conservative culture in cryptography [28] , we believe that it is meaningful to provide a proof without ROM for key agreement protocols. At least, it can reveal what happened when ROM is absent. Note that a traditional Deffie-Hellman protocol was proved in [24] without ROM. Their proof lacks an obvious no-matching proof since their protocol was under the assumption of duplex channel, i.e., simultaneous message transmission.
Our Contributions
We fail to find some direct related work about identity-based explicit key agreement protocols with a standard proof. In fact, this is the purpose of our protocol. We notice the trend of stand proof for schemes and protocols. Also we notice that there is no explicit authenticated key agreement protocols with a stand proof in the identity-based cryptography field. Motivated by Gentry's excellent work [29] , we deliberate on the design of a protocol with a stand proof. We deem that this protocol design method can be applied further if some more efficient schemes than Gentry's are proposed.
The main difference of our protocol design method lies in the MAC key, session key generation, and isolation fashion, which makes it possible that there is no direct usage of hash functions in our protocol. Let us explain our design procedure step by step. To exclude ROM from ID-based protocols, we firstly adopt a private key generation method where hash functions are not needed. Gentry in EuroCrypt 2006 proposed an IND-CPA ID-based encryption scheme [29] , which can be proved secure without random oracles. His method is adopted here. Secondly we need another method to isolate a session key from confirmation keys. We use key materials of a session key as confirmation keys if key materials and the session key can construct a hard problem. 
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The introduction of bilinear maps, and complexity assumption of our protocol are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our ID-EAKA protocol. The security model, proof and security properties of the protocol are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the definition of bilinear maps and related complexity assumptions.
Bilinear Maps
Basic notations that are used throughout this paper are as follows.
1) G and G T are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p;
2) g is a generator of G; 
Complexity Assumptions
The security of our protocol is based on a complexity assumption that is known as a truncated version of the decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption in [29] (truncated decisional ABDHE).
Truncated q-ABDHE The problem is that given a vector of q + 3 elements , where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, g in G, the random choice of α in Z p , and the random bits used by A.
The assumption is that there is no such an probability polynomial time (p.p.t.) algorithm A has a nonnegligible advantage .
Truncated Decisional q-ABDHE The problem of decisional version of truncated q-ABDHE is defined as one would expect. An algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has advantage in solving a truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem if
, where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, g in G, the random choice of α in Z p , the random choice of Z ∈ G T , and the random bits consumed by A.
The truncated decisional (t, , q)-ABDHE assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem in G.
Remarks. We notice the truncated q-ABDHE problem was introduced by Gentry [29] . The normal version, which is not truncated, is called the q-ABDHE problem. The q-ABDHE problem has additional (q −1) input terms, which seems easier to solve than the truncated version. The q-ABDHE problem is similar to the q-BDHE problem used in [30, 31] . The difference is that the q-ABDHE problem has an additional input term g (α q+2 ) . Gentry argued that introducing the additional term did not appear to ease the computation of e(g, g ) α q+1 , since the input vector misses the term
MAC Algorithm
We use the MAC security definition in [32] , where a practical one key CBC MAC scheme is defined. We need the unforgeable definition here.
A MAC algorithm is a map MAC :
n , where K MAC is a set of keys and we write MAC K (·) for MAC (K, ·). We say that an adversary
where the maximum is over all adversaries who run in time at most t, and make at mostueries, and each query is at most u bits. We say that a MAC algorithm is secure if Adv MAC (t, q, u) is sufficiently small.
ID-EAKA Protocol
There are three entities involved in our protocol: two users, Alice and Bob, who wish to establish an authenticated shared secret session key, and a PKG who generates user private keys using its public/private key pairs.
The PKG generates its public/private key pairs as follows. Let G and G T be groups of order p, and let e : G × G → G T be the bilinear map. The PKG picks randomly generators g, h ∈ G and α ∈ Z p . It
The public/private key pairs are given by public key = (g, g 1 , h, g T , MAC ), and private key = α, where MAC is a public MAC algorithm enjoying unforgeable property. Note that MAC :
n . We assume that the key set K MAC is the group G T . Certainly, we also can assume that there is a public algorithm uniformly mapping elements in G T to the key set K MAC . For simplicity, we just use G T as K MAC in the protocol description.
The PKG generates user keys as follows. To generate a private key for identity ID ∈ Z p , the PKG generates random r ID ∈ Z p , and outputs the private key
With the user keys, Alice and Bob run the following protocol to establish a shared session key with explicit key authentication. We use ID A and ID B to denote the identification strings of Alice and Bob. Fig.1 depicts the protocol. The detail procedure is as follows.
1) Alice uniformly at random selects x ∈ Zp, and com-
Alice sends M1 = IDA M11 M12 to Bob, where symbol denotes concatenation.
2) Bob uniformly at random selects y ∈ Zp, and computes M211 = (g1g 
Security Analysis
This section presents a security model, the proof in the model and security properties of our protocol.
Security Model
Our security model is based on the model of BlakeWilson et al. [22] for key agreement protocols and a nomatching definition in [23] . The no-matching definition is also adopted in [13] .
In the model, an oracle Π s i,j models the behavior of a party with identity i carrying out a protocol session in the belief that it is communicating with a party with identity j for the s-th time, where i, j ∈ I, s ∈ N 1 . The total number of possible parties is denoted by symbol |I|, and the total session number is denoted by symbol |N 1 |. One oracle instance is used only for one time, which maintains a variable view consisting of the oracle's protocol transcripts so far.
An adversary is modeled by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine that is assumed to have complete control over all communication links in the network and to interact with parties via oracle accesses. The adversary A is allowed to execute any of the following queries.
• Corrupt (i). This allows the adversary to get the long term private key of the party i. If party i does not exist, the system will setup a private key for the party, and send the private key to the adversary.
• Send (Π s i,j , X). The adversary sends a message X to the oracle Π s i,j . The system will give an output of Π s i,j to the adversary as response. If X = λ, the party i is asked to initiate a session s with party j, where λ is an empty string.
• Reveal (Π s i,j ). This asks the oracle Π s i,j to reveal whatever session key it currently holds.
An oracle exists in one of the following several possible states.
• Accepted: an oracle is accepted if it decides to accept, holding a session key, after receipt of properly formulated messages;
• Rejected: an oracle is rejected if it decides not to establish a session key and to abort the protocol;
• Unsettled: an oracle is unsettled if it has not made any decision to accept or reject;
• Revealed: an oracle is revealed if it has answered a Reveal query;
• 
To define an explicit authenticated key agreement protocol, we should prove that the protocol satisfies the following goals. 1) Correctness. If two oracles are matching, then both of them are accepted and have the same session key which is distributed uniformly at random in the session key sample space.
2) Secrecy. Adv is negligible.
3) Authentication. The probability of NoMatching(·) is negligible.
Remarks. Another query is about State(·) [24] . This kind of queries are disabled in the above model so that the model cannot capture the SSR property or known session-specific temporary information security. A protocol satisfying SSR property means that the protocol session key is produced together by long term secret key and temporal key material [24] . This fashion itself has advantages and disadvantages [22] . Since the session key of our protocol is produced solely by temporal key materials, we intend to exclude the special query.
Security Proof
The three goals are separately proved in three theorems. The first is dedicated for Correctness, the second for Authentication and the last for Secrecy. The second conclusion is used in the proof of the last theorem. Before the initiator accepts, the initiator has a view (M 1 , M 2 ) which is identical to the view of responder because the initiator and responder are matching. At that point,
and the initiator and responder has identical vector (M 1 M 21 ), so the equality M 23 = V M23 holds. The initiator will accept according to the protocol and give the last message to the responder. Before the responder accepts, the responder has a view (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) which is identical to the view of initiator. At that point,
Similarly, the responder will also accept. The session key is (g q+1 , g ) or a random element in G T .
B simulates a PKG as follows. B generates a random computing h from (g, g 1 , . . . , g q ). Other public parameters g T and MAC are defined the same as those in the protocol specification. The public parameters are (g, g 1 , h, g T , MAC ). There is no master-key belonging to B.
B generates user keys as follows. To generate a private key for identity ID ∈ Z p , if ID = α, B uses α to solve the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem immediately.
). This is a valid private key for ID, since g
as required. Note that if Corrupt queries are less than q − 1 times, the generated private key has identical distribution as in a real protocol context because of the randomly selected f (z).
Let f 2 (z) = z q+2 and let , g ), the simulated message is a qualified real message as we stated previously. By our assumption, D should have a non-negligible advantage to win the game. However if Z = e (g q+1 , g ), D has no advantage, which will be argued shortly. By the advantage differences, B can solve the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem.
We argue D's zero advantage when Z = e(g q+1 , g ) as follows. First of all, KM * ji in the simulated message is just a uniformly random and independent value from the viewpoint of D since the private key of party j, (r j , h j ), is not disclosed to D, and the first part of the private key, r j , is a uniformly random and independent value. So the MAC tag part M * 22 in the simulated message and MAC K←K (·) in the special message are indistinguishable for D. We continue to say that it is also impossible for D to distinguish M * 1 in the simulated message from M 1 in the special message. If D can distinguish them, then D can distinguish a simulated message from a real protocol message, which can be used to distinguish the challenge directly. Note that whether the simulated message is a real protocol message depends on the value of Z.
To conclude Phase 1.1, we say that if truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard, the private key of M 1 's reception party is not disclosed and the number of disclosed private keys is less than q − 1, two distributions {M 1 To conclude Phase 1.2, we give a more concrete expression to show B's advantage. While the advantage of A is , the advantage of B is |I| 2 |N1| − 1 , where 1 is the probability that message M 1 ||M 21 has been queried to B's MAC oracle. Since B's advantage should be negligible, it is clear the probability should be negligible.
Case 2. The probability of No-Matching(·) for a responder is negligible.
Again, there are two phases. The first phase is to conclude the indistinguishability of two distributions
The second phase is to reduce an adversary's advantage to an MAC forger's advantage.
Phase 2.1. It is similar to the proof in Case 1. The adversary D now is limited not to obtain the private key of the message M 2 's reception party. The simulator B simulates a PKG and generates user keys the same as it does in Case 1. The number of disclosed private keys is limited to be less than q − 1.
by protocol simulation as follows. B firstly selects a party i as the message M 2 reception party. Then B generates message M * (g q+1 , g ). Finally, if the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard, the private key of the message M 2 's reception party is not disclosed, and the number of disclosed keys is less than q − 1, and two distributions {M 1 ||M 2 ||M 3 } and
Phase 2.2. Again an adversary A is assumed. A chosen message attacker B for a MAC algorithm is used. B now picks parties {j, i} and a session t, guessing that A will succeed against a responder Π If the M 21 ||M 1 has been queried, B must do it on behalf of an initiator oracle Π s i,j where j is determined by the ID in the exponent part of message M 1 or a responder oracle Π t j,i with t = t. Since a random value y is embedded in the M 21 message, the probability is negligible of two independent responder oracles selecting one same value y ∈ Z q . Note that M 21 At last, we conclude that the probability of NoMatching(·) for a responder (an initiator) is negligible if the private key of an initiator (a responder) is not Corrupted, the number of Corrupted keys is less than q − 1, and the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard.
Theorem 4.3. The Adv is negligible. Proof. Let A be an adversary who has non-negligible Adv in the defined model. We construct an algorithm B to solve the truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem. B takes as input a random truncated decisional q-ABDHE challenge (g , g q+2 , g, g 1 , . . . , g q , Z), where Z is either e (g q+1 , g ) or a random element in G T .
B generates user keys as follows. To generate a private key for an identity ID ∈ Z p , if ID = α, B uses α to solve the truncated decisional problem immediately.
). This is a valid private key for ID, since g according to the protocol specification except that: For any other Send queries that are not related to the guessed oracle, B will act exactly according to the protocol specification.
• Corrupt(i). If i = α, B gives the private key of i as response. Else if i = α, B solves the truncated decisional problem.
• Reveal (Π If the adversary really shows its advantage, B will guess Z = e (g q+1 , g ). If the adversary has no advantage at all, B will guess Z = e(g q+1 , g ).
Analysis
If B does not stop before the output event, the simulation is indistinguishable. Firstly, if the number of Corrupt queries is less than q − 1, the generated private key has identical distribution as in a real protocol context because of the random selected f (z). Secondly, the outputs of other queries are generated according to the protocol specification or the model rules if we do not consider oracles Π Table 1 .
It is clear that if Z = e(g , g q+1 ), messages and related values are reasonably to be real protocol messages and real protocol values. However, if Z = e(g , g q+1 ), the messages and values are not qualified to claim to oracle's matching oracle. However from Theorem 2, we know that if j has not been Corrupted, the number of Corrupted keys is less than q − 1, and q-ABDHE problem is hard, and the probability of No-Matching(·) for Π s i,j is negligible. Here we use 3 to denote the negligible probability.
In general, B will have a probability
to justify adversary A's advantage.
When Z = e(g , g q+1 ), the adversary should show its advantage to B. When Z = e(g , g q+1 ), the session key K i,j is e (g, h) xsnzy (Z/e(g , g q+1 ))
r j xsnz y s or just a random value in G T . Since r j is not disclosed to the adversary, the value K i,j is just a random value from the view of the adversary. So there is no advantage for the adversary at all. Now B's strategy works. However, B should have no advantage so that A's advantage should be zero too.
Performance
First of all, let us show our protocol performance and the reason of the performance. In our protocol, the computation load for an initiator is the same as the load for a responder. The computation for one oracle includes 4 times exponentiation operations, 2 times MAC operations, and 2 times pair operations. We think that the computation load is a cost to obtain a standard proof. In fact, our protocol is as practical as Gentry's encryption scheme. Provided a more efficient ID-based encryption scheme with standard proof, it is easy to give a more efficient protocol with the same protocol design and proof method.
As we have said that we failed to find some direct related work, and we found no explicit authentication protocols with a stand proof in the ID-based field to be compared to ours. We note that the protocol in [24] has similar goals to ours but in a traditional field. Thanks to many advantages of ID-based cryptography, such as no need for certificates etc., our protocol has some advantages in application over the protocol in [24] but not in efficiency.
Security Properties
We consider the following common security properties.
• Known Session Keys. The Reveal query is designed to capture the notion. The fresh condition has never restricted adversary's Reveal ability to any oracles except the tested oracle and its possible matching oracle.
• [17] event are all negligible. So an impersonation attack can appear only with a negligible probability.
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience. Note that the authentication goal is proved while only one party's private is limited not to be Corrupted. So even one player's private key is Corrupted, nobody can cheat the player to be accepted with an impersonated ID.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy. Here we just informally claim that our protocol enjoys the property. The session key in our protocol is just related to two temporal random values in Z p . The session key has no relation to long term keys. So even long term keys are Corrupted, it just means that MAC keys can be obtained. Even an adversary knows e(g, h)
x and e(g, h) y , there is still a computation hard problem of obtaining e (g, h) xy .
• Session State Reveal. The property considers what happened when temporal state values are revealed. Apparently, the leakage of temporal value x or y in a session means that an adversary can impersonate a responder or an initiator in that session. If all temporal values are revealed, the session key will be disclosed. However the bad result is limited to this session only. One session with a new temporal value will not be affected by the leakage of temporal values in another session.
Conclusion
We proposed an ID-based protocol and a standard proof. The protocol employs a new method to isolate session keys from key confirmation keys. Due to the method, there is no direct usage of hash functions in the protocol and there are no random oracles in the proof procedure.
